Dislocation in Normativity, or the Impossibility of a Common Object Between Law and Psychology

Abstract

This essay examines the epistemological fracture between Law and Psychology in El Salvador, focusing on how both disciplines construct and operationalize the concept of conduct. It argues that the category of moral damage exposes a normative luxation—an underlying dislocation preventing the coherent articulation of juridical reasoning and psychological interpretation. The central proposal formulates a foundational figure of conduct, conceived as a degraded externalization of the internal forum, capable of becoming a measurable and operable object within the Euclidean space of both disciplines. This framing seeks to open the possibility for a shared ontology that transcends the current discursive disparity. The persistent dissociation between legal and psychological frameworks in El Salvador not only undermines the effectiveness of justice, but also reveals a deeper crisis in the symbolic and practical foundations of juridical action. Drawing from Hegel, Lacan, and the logic of natural sciences, the essay problematizes the assumption of conceptual continuity between conduct as a legal object and as a psychological phenomenon, emphasizing that the lack of ontological clarity produces institutional contradictions and epistemic tensions. Ultimately, it calls for a radical rethinking of justice when its foundational categories—such as damage, responsibility, or behavior—lack a stable and coherent grounding across disciplines.